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Dallas E Weaver's avatar

If you don't understand the impact of time delays on the supply-and-demand system, you cannot solve housing problems. Delays, such as permit delays, slow the supply response relative to the demand response, making the system mathematically unstable.

A good idea too late kills abundance and growth.

Zac Hill's avatar

Does this also imply that states with more states bordering them are better targets to attempt to seed diffusion? I might be reading the data too myopically, but my experience in local gov absolutely is commensurate with the ‘neighboring states’ thesis.

Alex B.'s avatar

Two cents, another great paper on this (while a working paper to be fair) is Jake Grumbach's “When Governments Learn from Copartisans: Partisan Policy Diffusion” - https://ucf2388b7406f295c7f4d6ed1d9d.dl.dropboxusercontent.com/cd/0/inline2/DBaw-2Fd5s93_OXOCDRZOvvRYhANEUpqsOd8MMgoUhLuzmX-jaG980UBpnA3J83A3CaQN-Z6LrNXItWXN4vzW7CWezthmV5tc9PqDcwc3jheE5nbXRNX_6mSKCT6Cz3z2OEq_oFRG6omoPcUgPO3GiTELrFBLQMRXC9b-vgxA2UVY8LP3NxYOIJcPxR8ZQ8E_GhqaZ7aY4xv2DhrhYtqBwGh90M6jzCb5u3mly-bfNLv3FFRIN6RVbNo2BqIzYPp5Wg8ue28R8tQ59gft_DLIgA5cFshfKo4pQRNY8KTyfIqQSuXOE_INt7LTWW25Mj1shKQYSA6pUkgBsLzhhCAeXGJ469FDrHSUsaD_2mzcQIT1g/file

“When Governments Learn from Copartisans: Partisan Policy Diffusion” (winner of Best Paper in Public Policy at APSA 2018): Louis Brandeis' theory of states as laboratories of democracy suggests that governments engage in learning, emulating successful policies from other states and rejecting unsuccessful ones. However, Brandeis' theory did not address the role of parties. Politicians have incentives to avoid implementing successful outpartisan policies, as this may improve the outparty brand. Furthermore, organizations, such as party-aligned interest and expert groups that provide policymakers with information, may bias institutional learning against outpartisan policies. In turn, state governments may not converge on politically or economically successful policies. This article tests theories of partisan policy learning using a large dataset of policies in the U.S. states. Emulation of successful policies is more likely to occur between governments controlled by the same party. Consistent with the nationalization of party coalitions, success interacts more weakly with geography. The findings have implications for our understanding of the incentives of federalism in the context of partisan polarization.